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JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE
CHESTER G. VERNIER, ELMER A. WILCOX, WILLIAM G. HALE
FROM E. A. Wicox.
CONCURRENT JURISDICTION.
State v. Milano. La. 71 So. 131. Effect of dismissal in one jurisdiction.
The defendant was one of many persons who were prosecuted for the illegal
sale of liquors in Shreveport, on informations filed in the city court. Four of
five of the cases were tried and the judge acquitted the defendants in each,
announcing that he would not convict on the uncorroborated testimony of
hired negro "spotters." As such testimony was relied upon in all the cases,
the district attorney entered a nol. pros. in each of the remaining cases, which
included the one against the defendant. The evidence was laid before the
grand jury, and indictments for the same offenses were returned to the
district court, which had concurrent jurisdiction. The defendant pleaded the
former proceedings as depriving the district court of jurisdiction, but was tried,
convicted and sentenced. He appealed. It was held that, "when a criminal
prosecution is commenced in a court having jurisdiction there is no process
by which it can be transferred to another court of concurrent jurisdiction,
and what the prosecuting attorney cannot do directly he should not do
indirectly.". The court also thought that abondoning a prosecution in one
court, "for an alleged violation of a sumptuary or blue law," and bring-
ing a prosecution for the same offense in another court, for the purpose
of getting it before a different judge, was "not calculated to increase the re-
spect that is due to the courts." The conviction was reversed and it was
ordered that the defendant be discharged. The same principle was applied in
two similar cases, State v. Abraham, 71 So. 193 and State v. Abraham, 71
So. 769.
It is a rule generally recognized that when two or more courts have con-
current jurisdiction over a case "the tribunal which first gets it, holds it to
the exclusion of the other, until its duty is fully performed and the jurisdiction
invoked in exhausted." Taylor v. Taintor, 16 Wall. 366, 21 L. Ed. 287. In
most of the cases decided under this rule, a case was actually pending in the
first court at the time when the second assumed jurisdiction. In the Milano
case several of these cases were cited. But the Louisiana court also relied
upon Coleman v. State, 83 Miss. 290, 35 So. 937, 64 L. R.A. 807, decided in
1904, which seems to be the earliest decision that the court which first gets a
case before it retains exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter after the
case is dismissed. It was charged that Coleman had killed his wife under
such circumstances that he might be indicted in either of two counties. He
was indicted for manslaughter in one, but this case was dismissed before trial.
He was later indicted for murder in the other county and convicted. The
conviction was reversed upon the ground that the prosecution in the first county
had iested exclusive jurisdiction in its court, so that the court of the second
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county had no jurisdiction. It was said that as the case could not have been
transferred from one county to the other, the same thing could not be done
indirectly. It was further argued that while the rule was intended to prevent
conflicts between courts of concurrent jurisdiction, it was more than a mere
rule of procedure. "It is a substantial and valuable right guaranteed by the
law to a party accused of crime. It insures that he shall not twice be placed
in jeopardy for the same offense; that he shall be forced to undergo but one
trial, and shall not be harassed by repeated indictments in different courts and
different jurisdictions." It was conceded that he might still be indicted for
murder in the first county, as he had not yet been in jeopardy. In 1910 this
case was followed in State v. Hughes, 96 Miss. 581, 51 So. 464. But in 1912
the same court had to decide the same question in two cases, Rogers v. State,
58 So. 536 and Rogers v. State, 58 So. 537. These were cases dealing with viola-
tions of the liquor laws, over which the justice and circuit courts had concurrent
jurisdiction. Affidavits were filed against the defendants in the justice court,
on which they were arrested and bound over to appear for trial on the 9th of
November. On the 6th of November indictments charging the same offenses
were returned to the circuit court. On the day set for the trial in the justice
court, the county attorney, with the consent of he court but against the protest
of the defendants, dismissed the cases brought there. They objected to the
jurisdiction of the circuit court, but were tried and convicted. On their appeal
it was conceded that "where concurrent jurisdiction is vested in two courts, the
court first acquiring jurisdiction acquires exclusive jurisdiction." But it was
said that the rule had no application to this case. "The reason of the rule is
to prevent confusion and conflicts in jurisdiction, and to prevent a person
from being twice tried for the same offense, but no defendant has a vested
right to be tried in any particular court of concurrent jurisdiction. When one
court of concurrent jurisdiction has acquired jurisdiction and voluntarily re-
linquishes it by a nolle pros, or dismissal of the case, there can be no legal or
logical *reason for preventing the other court from proceeding. * * * At the
date that this plea in abatement was filed, no other court had jurisdiction of
the offense and there was therefore no impediment in the way to his trial under
the indictment. It can make no difference to this appellant from what motives
the justice of the peace may have acted in dismissing this suit. * * * The
appellant can only be interested in having but one prosecution before a fair
and impartial tribunal in whatever court he is arraigned for trial on the charge.
The State is only interested in seeing to it that prosecutions for infraction of
the law be conducted in at least one of the courts." The conviction was af-
firmed. The Coleman and Hughes cases were not mentioned and were evi-
dently not brought to the attention of the court, though the judge who wrote
the opinion also wrote that in the Hughes case. In following the Coleman
case, the Louisiana court was apparently unaware of either the Hughes or the
Rogers case. In unconsciously overruling its former decision the Mississippi
court seems to have reached the correct result, as no sound reason has been
given to show that upon the dismissal of a case brought in one court, the
matter is not again within the concurrent jurisdiction of all.
CONFLIcT oF CouRTs.
State v. Clark. Tex. Ct. App., 187 S.W. 760. Writ of prohibition against
injunction preventing criminal prosecution. The old conflict between the
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courts of King's Bench and Chancery, which came to a deadlock when Coke
was Chief Justice, and Elismere was Chancellor, has broken out again, in some-
what different form, in Texas. After a truce of three hundred years, the war
of injunctions and prohibitions is on once more. When the framers of the
Texas constitution provided that the Supreme Court should have final author-
ity over all civil cases and the Court of Criminal, Appeals should be the ulti-
mate arbiter in criminal prosecutions, they doubtless thought they had con-
structed a lawful fence, bull-proof and hog-tight, between the two jurisdic-
tions. They were mistaken. The legislature enacted a local option law gov-
erning pool rooms, similar to the local option liquor laws. The constitution-
ality of this law was promptly attacked, on the ground that it delegated legis-
ative power, in violation of article 1, section 28 of the state constitution. The
Court of Criminal Appeals declared the statute to be constitutional; Ex parte
Francis, 72 Tex. Ct. Rep. 304, 165 S. W. 147. McLennan county voted to close
the pool rooms; and one Reed, who was running a pool room there, obediently
closed. A little later the Supreme Court, in a habeas corpus case, declared
the law to be unconstitutional; Ex parte Mitchell, 177 S.W. 953. Mr. Reed
promptly reopened. The county attorney threatened to prosecute him. Reed
petitioned the State District Court, alleging that he had property in pool tables,
a hall, licenses to run a pool room, and in the prospective earnings to be de-
rived from that industry; that the county attorney was about to prosecute him
under the statute; and that the statute was unconstitutional. He asked that
the county attorney and his assistants be enjoined from instituting any crim-
inal proceedings under the law. Judge Clark, of the district court, issued the
injunction. Soon after this, the Court of Criminal Appeals, in Ex parte John
Mode, 180 S. W. 709, reaffirmed the constitutionality of the statute. There-
upon the county attorney sought its aid, asking for writs of habeas corpus,
prohibition, and mandamus. He was directed to apply to the district court
for a dissolution of the injunction.. He did so, but the application was denied.
The Court of Criminal Appeals then ordered the writs asked for to issue,
preliminary to a hearing. After a hearing it was ordered that a writ issue
prohibiting the judge of the district court from interfering further with the
action of the county attorney in bringing criminal proceedirigs, and prohibiting
Reed and his attorneys from taking any steps to prevent the institution of
prosecutions. The court declared that the injunction was void and that the
county attorney was released from all restraint sought to be placed upon him
in the performance of his duties. It directed that any other writs, necessary
to the enforcement of its judgment, be issued.
The majority opinion, by Judge Harper, was to the effect that as courts
of equity deal only with civil and property rights, they will not enjoin criminal
proceedings, unless it is necessary to preserve property rights that are clearly
involved. As there is an adequate remedy at law in case of criminal prosecu-
tion under an unconstitutional statute, by setting up the invalidity of the act
as a defense, equity has no jurisdiction to enjoin such prosecutions. The
license to run a pool room is but a permit, and grants no vested right that may
not be revoked. In portions of the state pool rooms have become the resort
of thieves and criminals of every class; more "bootlegging" is carried on in
'themi than in any other place; such places are clearly subject to the police
power of the state, and no one would have a vested right to run one which
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equity could or would protect by injunction. Equity cannot enjoin a grand
jury from indicting, nor the trial court from trying the case, and if the county
attorney is enjoined from acting, the trial court may appoint a special prose-
cutor; but any court that has jurisdiction to issue an order or writ should have
power to enforce its order. Because of the constitutional and statutory limita-
tions upon its power, the Supreme Court could not release an indicted person
on habeas corpus. For these reasons the civil courts have no jurisdiction to
interfere with criminal prosecutions. If an appeal should be taken from the
order of the district court that the injunction issue, it would be two or three
years before it would be finally determined whether the county attorney could
institute criminal proceedings. Meanwhile all who chose could openly run
pool rooms in the county. Where an inferior court is acting outside of its
jurisdiction, the remedy by appeal in inadequate, and the interests of the public
are affected, a writ of prohibition may issue. Hence the writ should be issued
in this case.
Judge Davidson, who had dissented in the Francis and Mode cases, dis-
sented upon the grounds that the injunction is a civil suit and not within the
jurisdiction of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Delay in the decision of a
civil suit does not confer jurisdiction over such case on a criminal court. Under
the constitution this court can issue extraordinary writs only to enforce its
own jurisdiction, but there is no criminal prosecution pending, over which this
court may enforce its jurisdiction. Hence the writ should not issue.
Presiding Judge Prendergast than filed a concurring opinion in which
he argued that the Court of Criminal Appeals has exclusive, supreme and final
jurisdiction in all criminal matters, while the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction
in criminal matters, but is prohibited from taking such jurisdiction. The Court
of Criminal Appeals alone has power to pass upon the constitutionality of
criminal statutes, and its decisions in such cases are binding upon all other
courts. It does not appear how the Supreme Court got jurisdiction of the
question in the Mitchell case, and its decision therein was erroneous. The
Court of Criminal Appeals has held the pool room law to be constitutional.
Reed has attempted to nullify that decision by enjoining the county attorney
from prosecuting under the statute. If this can be done, every other opinion
of the court can be set aside by any and every district judge and no criminal
law can be enforced unless permitted by inferior judges. To prevent this the
Court of Criminal Appeals may protect its jurisdiction by issuing writs of
prohibition. Reed had no vested property rights to be protected. When the
law was put in force in McLennan county, he closed the pool room he had
previously operated. After the decision in the Mitchell case he paid the state
and county pool room taxes and hired a hall. Equity will not protect prop-
erty rights acquired after a criminal law is in force, against the operation of
that law. Reed should rely upon the unconstitutionality of the statute as a
defense, if a prosecution is brought against him.
Writs were also issued to another district judge in two similar cases;
State v. Nabers, 187 S.W. 783 and State v. Nabers, 187 S.W. 784.
CORRUr PRACTicEs AcT.
People v. Gausley. Mich. 158 N. W. 195. Application to local option elec-
tion. Constitutionality. Defendant, an officer of a Brewing Company, paid
$500 of the corporation's money to a "Personal Liberty League", to be used
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in opposing prohibition at a pending local option election. He was convicted
under a statute prohibiting any officer of a corporation, nor formed for politi-
cal purposes, from paying "any money belonging to such corporation to any
candidate or to any political committee, for the payment of any election ex-
penses whatever." He appealed, contending that the statute applied only to
elections of officers, and not to local option elections; and that if it should be
construed to apply to the latter it was unconstitutional because it denied to
corporations the right granted to natural persons to make political contribu-
tions, and denied them the right to make expenditures to protect their interests
in contests at the polls. The appellate court being equally divided, the con-
viction was affirmed. Four judges thought that "while most of the provisions
of the act relate to the conduct and duties of candidates and political com-
mittees, yet that it was intended to regulate and control all elections and elec-
tion expenses, wherever the electors are called upon to decide any measure or
measures that may be before the people" was clear. The abuse to be guarded
against was as apparent in a local option election as in the election of officers,
since partisan zeal and spirit were as intense in one case as in the other. The
fact that two other sections of the act applied to "measures" as well as to
candidates aided in reaching this conclusion, and the question to be determined
at the election would be a "political measure." They also thought that the
act did not deprive the corporation of its property, impair the value of that
property, nor deprive the corporation of any right or privilege granted by the
laws under which it was created and existed, so as' to violate the Fourteenth
Amendment, and that in view of the historical abuse of corporate funds to
influence elections, and the fact that the privilege of contributing to campaign
funds has not been granted to corporations, the Legislature could properly put
them into a class of persons who should not be allowed to contribute at all.
As the act did not prevent the officers and members of corporations from freely
speaking, writing and publishing their views, it did not violate the provision
of the state constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech.
The other four judges thought it doubtful whether the act was intended
to cover local option elections, and that this doubt should be resolved in favor
of the defendant, since penal statutes should be construed strictly.
CUSTODY OF CHILD.
Brana v. Brana. La. 71 So. 519. Conflict between juvenile and divorce
courts. A wife charged her husband, before the juvenile court, with failure
to support their nine-months-old child. On the same day her husband sued for
a divorce from bed and board, in the district court. The juvenile court gave
the mother temporary custory of the child until further orders of the court.
Five days later the district court entered an order in the divorce proceedings,
giving custody to the mother. Five months later, the district court, after
a hearing on the husband's application for a change of custody, ruled that the
juvenile court had no jurisdiction over the child, since it was not a "neglected
child", and awarded the custody of the child to the husband. The wife applied
for writs of certiorari and prohibition. The court held that while the juvenile
court would have no jurisdiction if the child was not a "neglected-'child", yet
the condition of the child was only quasi-jurisdictional, and the juvefiile court
had jurisdiction to determine whether the child fell within the statutory de-
scription. Its decision that the child was "neglected" could not be attacked
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collaterally, hence the district court could not award custody on the ground
that the juvenile court was without jurisdiction.
The juvenile court got jurisdiction first, by its order made five days before
that of the district court. But the authority to act does not 'depend upon
priority, as the jurisdiction of the two courts is not concurrent. "The one
jurisdiction is civil, it acts as between the parents. The other is quasi-crim-
inal; it acts as between the state and the parents, or as between the state and
the child." After the district court had awarded the custody to one parent,
"as being the one most worthy, or least unworthy, of the charge, there is noth-
ing to prevent the juvenile court from finding that the child is being neglected,
and therefore should be taken away from both parents, or from the parent who
is neglecting it" As the court could not review the facts in a certiorari pro-
ceeding, it must assume that the finding of the juvenile court was correct.
Hence the writ of prohibition was issued.
TRIAL.
State z. Tracy. N. Dak. 158 N. W. 1069. At hospital. After the jury
had been impaneled and sworn on motion of the state's attorney, -supported by
the affidavits of two doctors that the prosecuting witness was confined in a
hospital on account of an operation for appendicitis and was in no condition
to be brought into court to testify, the court directed that the jury, court offi-
cials, the defendant, and his attorney, be conveyed to the hospital to take the
testimony of this witness. The defendant objected. On appeal it was held
that this deprived him of no constitutional or statutory right. While it is
contemplated that court shall be holden in the court room provided for that
purpose, it is not expressly required that it be so held. The statutes provide
that if the court room prove inadequate or insufficient, adequate quarters may
be obtained, and that the jury may be taken to the place where the transaction
in suit occurred, to view the place. Trial courts are vested with great dis-
cretion as regards the conduct of trials, and its exercise may be reviewed by
the appellate court only in case of manifest abuse. In this case the court's
rulings "were not only within its discretion, but constituted an eminently proper
and wise exercise of such discretion." Affirmed.
SELF INCRIMINATION.
State v. Lyon. Ia. 157 N. W. 742. Articles taken from person. The
Supreme Court of Iowa held that in a prosecution for perjury, in which de-
fendant testified that he did not sell intoxicating liquor to a named person on
a certain date and did not accept money thereon, a marked one-dollar bill given
by an officer to another for the purpose of buying liquor of defendant, was ad-
missible in evidence, though it was taken from defendant in a search of his
person and against his will.
The constitutional guaranty of due process of law denies the right to make
defendant give incriminating testimony in any case. (State of Iowa v. Height
117 Iowa 650.) This clause in the Federal constitution seems to restrict as
narrowly as the express stipulations in state constitutions against compelling
witness to incriminate himself, and statutes compelling the witness to so testify
but guaranteeing immunity from prosecution on such evidence are declared
unconstitutional.
It is due process to admit evidence of inculpating facts discovered through
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an involuntary confession. This was allowed at common law, even in view
of the stringent laws against the old inquisition with its thumb screws and
what not,-1 Leach 263, State v. Motley 7 Rich Law 327. And there is no
rule of law forbidding an officer upon the arrest of one charged with crime
from making a close and careful search of the person of the individual for
stolen property, instruments used in commission of crime, or any article which
may give a clue to the commission of the crime, or identify the criminal. Reif-
suyder v. Lee et al., 44 Iowa 401.
Some courts receive evidence obtained from compelling the defendant to
make tracks, State v. Graham, 75 N. C. 256; Walker v. State Tex., App. 256.
Other courts will not admit such evidence, People v. Meade, 50 Mich. 228;
Jordan v. State, 32 Miss. 382. It seems that so long as the facts learned and
introduced are not derived directly from language used in an involuntary
confession, or from an unreasonable search and seizure for the primary pur-
pose of securing evidence, such facts are admissible.
The Iowa Court allows the right to require a defendant charged with
crime to stand up before the court for the purpose of identification. State v.
Reasby, 100 Ia. 231.
An accused person cannot be compelled to exhibit those portions of his
body which are usually covered, for the purpose of securing identification or
other evidence against him. State v. N9rdstrom, 7 Wash. 506.
Nor can evidence secured by a forced physical examination of accused
defendant as to covered portions of his person be introduced (Iowa v. Height,
117 Ia. 650), even when for the purpose of identification. Facts disclosed on
a search of his pockets may be evidenced. A. H. BOLTON.
FROM C. G. VERNIER.
BURDEN OF PROOF.
Smith v. State. Okla. 159 Pac. 668. Proof of self-defense. In a homi-
cide case, where defendent denied firing the fatal shot and there was evidence
tending to show that the homicide was justifiable on the ground of self-de-
fense, the court instructed the jury in part as follows:
"If they believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that at the
time the said shooting was done, it was done in self-defense as defined and
set out in the instructions herein, you should find the defendant not guilty."
"No. 18. The court instructs the jury, that if they believe from the evi-
dence in this case beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant and one
Charles Williams were just immediately prior to the firing of the shots which
caused the death of the deceased, engaged in a difficulty, and that the de-
ceased, armed with a deadly weapon, voluntarily engaged in said difficulty and
struck the defendant over the head and knocked him down, and that both the
said Charles Williams and the deceased jumped or fell upon the defendant and
all three, while on the ground engaged in a scramble, and during the said
scuffle or scramble the shots were fired which produced the death of the de-
ceased, and shall further believe from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that defendent did not fire the shot that took deceased's life, then and in that
event, they should find the defendant not guilty."
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Held, prejudicial error, as placing the burden of proof upon the defend-
ant, and requiring the jury, before finding for acquittal, to believe from the
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was innocent.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
State v. Sterrin. N. H. 98 AtI. 482. Regulating use of automobiles; self-
incrimination.
Laws 1911, c. 133, sec. 20, requiring automobile drivers, knowing that they
have injured a person, to stop, return to the scene of the accident, and to
give name and address, and other information to any proper person demanding
it, applies even whdre the only person to be found is the injured party, and he
is unconscious, but the accident occurred at 6 p.m. on a city street where
persons might be expected to pass.
Such act is not unconstitutional as violating Bill of Rights, art. 15, re-
quiring accused to furnish evidence which might be used against him in a
criminal proceeding, the operation of an automobile being a privilege and not
a right, and therefore subject to such restrictions and conditions as the Legis-
lature may impose.
State v. Latham. Me. 98 AtI. 579. Validity of semi-monthly pay bill.
Rev. St. c. 136, sec. 12, requiring milk dealers to pay for purchases semi-
monthly and providing for punishment by fine on default in payment, is un-
constitutional as violating Const. U. S., Amend. 14, as to class'-legislation, and
is not justifiable under the police power as being for promotion of public health.
State v. Murphy. Conn. 98 Atl. 343. Validity of statute regulating dis-
play of advertisements upon real estate.
Pub. Acts 1915, c. 314, requiring the issuance of a license and the payment
of a license fee for the display upon real estate of an advertisement contain-
ing more than four square feet of surface, held not an arbitrary and unwar-
ranted interference with a lawful business, in an attempt to prohibit such
business, and not contrary to the Constitution as authorizing the taking of
property without just compensation, without due process of law, or in denial of
equal rights.
EVIDENCE.
State v. Messervey. S. Car. 89 S. E. 662. Etidence of malice in homicide
case.
In trial for murder of A., accused having killea him and F., testimony that
accused, while F.'s son was crying at his father's casket, said: "It is not a
damn bit of use crying over these old men; they did not have much time to live"
-was admissable, since it was for the jury to say whether accused was speaking
of A. as well as F., and it was competent on the question of malice.
Watts, J., dissenting.
INDICTMENT.
People v. Ferrara. Cal. 159 Pac. 621. Instructions; disjunctive; force
and fear.
Under Pen. Code, sec. 211, defining robbery as felonious taking of person-
alty from person against his will by force or fear, instruction, permitting con-
viction if the offense was accomplished by "force or fear," is proper, though
the information alleged "force and fear."
JURY.
766 JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Griffin v. State. Ga. 98 S. E. 625. Competency of jurors: relation to
parties.
One who is related within the prohibited degree to a mere depositor of
a bank is noy incompetent to sit as a juror upon the trial of the president of
the bank, on the charge of violating sec. 204, Pen. Code 1910.
Hodges, J., dissenting.
SELF-DEFENSE.
State v. Kilgore. S. Car. 89 S. E. 668. Propriety of referring to abuse of
this defense in instructions.
In a prosecution for assault and battery, the instruction of the court, re-
ferring to the many times in which the plea of self-defense is asserted, where
the facts do not make out a case of necessity, held not erroneous.
Fraser and Watts, JJ., dissenting.
VMuuicr.
State v. Williams. N. J. 98 AtI. 416. Form of verdict.
A verdict in the form, "the jury has agreed to convict defendant guilty
.of murder with recommendation of mercy by the court if the court will
accept," is inadequate to support judgment of conviction; there being in fact
no verdict as long as process of agreement continues or there is a contingency.
The Chancellor, the Chief Justice, and Swayze, Terhune, Heppinheimer,
and Williams, JJ., dissenting.
IDEM SONANS.
Watkins v. State. Ga., 89 S. E. 624. Variance between allegations and
evidence.
On a writ of error for refusal to instruct the jury that no conviction
could be had on an indictment for a criminal assault upon Maria Story, where
the only evidence was of such criminal assault upon Marie Story, it was held
that there was no error for-
1. The two names are idem sonans.
2. Identitate personae and not identate nominis is and should always
have been the true and only issue in cases of this kind.
Under common law criminal procedure, the indictment or information
must charge a definite person with a definite criminal act. Consequently the
indictment must contain the name of the defendant (Campbell v. State, 109
11. 420), and if the crime charged is committed upon or in connection with
another person (except an accomplice) must also contain the name of such
other person. State v. Hover, 58 Vt. 497. The reasons for these requirements
are, at common law, to properly notify the defendant of the act of which he
is accused so that he may be able to defend himself, and in the United States
under provisions of the state constitutions, to prevent him from being put in
double jeopardy. United States v. Bennett, 194 Federal 630. But as to the
elements of the crime itself it is immaterial whether it is committed by A or
B and whether it is committed upon X 'or Y. Comnwnwealth v. Buckley, 145
Mass. 181. Accordingly where the name of the accused or the victim is un-
known it has always been allowable to aver that fact and charge the crime by
a description of the accused, United States v. Upham, 43 Federal 68, or of the
victim as the case may require, United States v. Durand, 161 U. S. 307.
To meet these requirements and at the same time avoid a failure of jus-
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tice through clerical errors in the framing of the indictment or information, the
courts as early as the time of Elizabeth adopted the rule that in naming the
accused or his victim the sound of the name and not the spelling thereof should
govern. 21 Am. & Eng. Encyclopedia of Law, 313 (XV). As defined by
modern courts, names are idem sonans if the ear has difficulty in distinguishing
them as ordinarily pronounced. State v. Ak~a, 134 Pac. 209. Since its estab-
lishment this rule has been firmly imbedded in the American law, no less than
300 cases having been appealed on this rule alone, and of these nearly 100
have been held not within the rule and the defendant either released or a new
trial ordered.
But owing to incongruities of English orthography, the prevalence of for-
eign names of peculiar orthography and pronunciation and the changes in the
mode of spelling and pronouncing the same name by the same person at dif-
ferent times, the rule of idem sonans has not proven satisfactory in securing
punishment of offenders against the law, and at the same time protecting the
accused in his rights of notification of the act of which he is accused and
freedom from "double jeopardy."
In view of the considerations on which the rule is founded, it appears
that it never was founded on reason. The name of the person (accused or
victim) is merely a convenient means of identifying such person. And when
the person is sufficiently identified by other means the mere failure to use the
most convenient one should not be allowed to affect the case. Dissenting
opinion of Carter, J., in People v. Smith, 258 Ill. 502. In addition to such
identification all that should be required is notice to the accused. Ordinarily
the identification itself will be notice to the accused, but it is conceivable that
in some cases the victim of the crime could be so described by means of
hidden marks as to identify him perfectly, but at the same time not give the
defendant sufficient notice before the trial as to enable him to properly defend
the case. The adoption of such a rule is founded in reason and will not
materially affect the present procedure beyond what is necessary, for indict-
ments will still generally be framed by use of the name of the accused and
the victim rather than by description, for that. is the most convenient means of
so doing.
The present rule leads to useless technicality. In State v. Smith, supra,
the verdict of guilty was reversed and a new trial ordered although it was
proved that the defendant knew of what specific act he was charged including
the person on whom he was accused of having committed it and although it
was proved that he did the act as charged, because the victim was named in
the indictment as Rosetta, while her true name was Rosalia. Though here
there was probably no miscarriage or failure of justice, as it is almost certain
that on the new trial the defendant was convicted, the rule led to a useless
delay of justice, and an additional expense to the state.
But it seems that in those cases which are left to the jury to determine
-.whether two names are idem sonans, a verdict in favor of the defendant would
lead to a failure of justice though it was proved that the defendent did the
act, for it seems that another prosecution could be defeated by a plea of former
jeopardy. A plea of former jeopardy is sufficient if it alleges that the defend-
ant had on a previous day been tried for the identical offense. McCullough v.
State, 34 S.W. 753.
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In an endeavor to follow the rule courts are guilty of great inconsistency.
Williams and William (surname) are idem sonans. Williams v. State, 5 Tex.
Cr. App. 226. But Wilkin and Wilkins are not idem sonans. Brown v. State,
28 Tex. Cr. App. 65. Nor are Frank and Franks idev; sonans. Pardman v.
State, 2 Tex. Cr. App. 228. Nor Wood and Woods. 21 Tex. Cr. App. 320.
But Michael and Michaels are idem sonans. State v. House, Busb. 410 (North
Carolina) cited by the Texas court with approval.
The explanation of these cases seems to be that the courts adhere to the
rule of idein sonans, but that their real reasons for the decision is based on
the fact of whether the name as used was prejudicial to the rights of the de-
fendant. So in Williams v. State, supra, the court while holding that the
variance did not prejudice the rights of the defendant and so was not a fatal
defect, yet devotes three pages to proving that the names a-e idem sonans.
5 Tex. Cr. App. 226, at 229 to 232. Other courts habitually, when stretching
or distorting this rule to meet the requirements of the case, express in terms
of idem sonans, what in reality is not idem sonans but identitae personae.
Balswic v. Balswic, 102 N. E. 139; State v. Cowser, 157 S.W. 758; Demis v.
State, 11 S.W. 647; Mindex v. Satte, 38 S. W. 995.
And it seems that the state constitutions and statutes which forbid a re-
versal of a decision unless the error has subjected the appellant to substan-
tial injustice should lead to an aboliation of this rule. Kennedy v. State, 62
Ind. 138; State v. McKunnif, 70 Ia. 217.
In the case under discussion the court went further than most courts are
willing to go, but nevertheless they relied on the old rule while stating the
new one. It is submitted that adherence to the rule of iden sonans merely
tends to confuse the courts, prolong prosecution, and occasionally offers the
guilty defendant a loophole of escape. AV. C. DALZELL, Palo Alto, Cal.
FROM WII.LIAM G. HALE.
CONFESSIONS.
People v. Trybus. 113 N. E. 538 (N. Y.) Voluntary character of con-
fessions-Inducenents.
The conduct of a private detective, employed by a district attorney to in-
vestigate a murder, in grabbing defendant quickly, shoving him against a
radiator, and searching him when he was brought to his office, and in holding
him as a private captive locked up in a police station, in order to obtain state-
ments from him before formal complaint, and before he might see friends or
counsel, did not per se make the defendant's confession of guilt involuntary
and hence inadmissible, although such circumstances might be considered by
the jury in determining their voluntary character.
Reprehensible conduct of detective.
"The conduct of a detective in needlessly laying hands on a helpless man
detained by him without legal warrant deserves the severest censure. The
practice of detectives to take in custody and hold in durance persons merely
suspected of crime, in order to obtain statements from them before formal




Erber v. United States. 234 Fed Rep. 221. Accomplice's Testimony.
In the federal courts a conviction may be had on the testimony of an ac-
complice without corroboration, but the absence of corroboration may give
emphasis to errors so as to justify a reversal of a judgment of cbnviction.
DEFRAUDING GOVERN-MENT.
United States v. Gradwell et al. 234 Fed. Rep. 446. Corrupting Elections
-Criminal Code (Act March 4, 1909, C. 321); Par. 37, 35 Stat. 1096 (Comp.
St. 1913, Par. 10201), Construed.
The above statute making it an offense to conspire "to defraud the United
States in any manner or for any purpose", is not intended for protection against
corruption of a state election at which a Representative in Congress is chosen,
but for the protection of the operations of the organized government.
"Primarily a fraud upon a state election for Representatives in Congress is a
fraud upon the right, not of the United States government, but of the people
of a particular state. * * * As the defendants' brief points out, there is a
sharp and clear distinction between a conspiracy to obstruct the administration
of a law of the United States and a conspiracy which affects the constitution
of one of the great departments of government. While there are two sides
to the matter, one state and one national, the interest of the United States is so
well protected otherwise that it cannot be presumed that the conspiracy statute
was enacted with any thought of the application which the government now
seeks to make.
Perara v. United States, 235 Fed. Rep. 515. Good Character.
The defendant was charged with stealing certain mail matter while acting
as a railway postal clerk. The court, after referring to the fact that the de-
fendant had introduced evidence for the purpose of showing his good character
for honesty, integrity, and mortality, instructed the jury as follows: "Such
evidence is admissible and should be considered by the jury; and, if it is of
such a nature as to lead the jury to believe that it is improbable that a man
of such high character would commit such *a crime, and for that reason it
raises a reasonable doubt in your minds as to whether the defendant really is
guilty of the offense as charged, he is entitled to the benefit of that doubt and
your verdict should be not guilty." But this part of the instruction was fol-
lowed by an extended caution against giving too much weight to such evidence,
in which the court stated among other things that, "We often hear of cases
where men of the very highest character, even ministers of the gospel, deacons
of the church-have been sometimes found to be secretly engaged in vice and
crime. Not only that, there are many crimes that can only be committed by
men who bear a good reputation, such as the crime in this case. * * * Under the
law, before he (a postal clerk) can obtain employment, he must upon his ap-
plication, get the recommendation of two reputable citizens vouching for his
integrity, etc." In holding the latter part of the charge erroneous, the court
on appeal, says: "By direct statement, innuendo, and suggestion it, in effect,
nullified the true rule as first stated, and made good reputation of doubtful
value and probably a positive disadvantage to the defendant."
FORMER JEOPA"DY.
Crowley v. State, 113 N. E. 658 (Ohio).
The defendant was charged in this action with an assault with intent to
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commit rape. He pleaded in defense that he had previously been charged with
an assault based on the same act and had been tried before the mayor of Lan-
caster, convicted and sentenced to 120 days in the workhouse and that under
the provisions of Section 10, Art. 1, of the Constitution, he could not be placed
in jeopardy again for the same offense. Held: Conviction sustained. The Court
in which the defendant was convicted of assault had no jurisdiction to try the
accused on a charge for a greater offense, hence, in that court he could not
have been tried for an assault with intent to commit rape. Therefore, he has
not previously been in jeopardy on the present charge.
REcEIvING STOLEN GOODS.
Kasle v. United States. 233 Fed. Rep. 878.
(1) Where talleysmen employed by a railroad were required to check
freight in and out of cars, the freight did not pass into their possession, so that
their wrongful appropriation would amount merely to embezzlement; but such
appropriation is larceny, and one knowingly receiving goods so appropriated is,
when they are part of an interstate shipment, guilty of the offense of receiving
goods stolen while part of an interstate shipment, denounced by Act Feb. 13,
1913, C. 50, 37 Stat., 670.
(2) It is not necessary under this act to prove that the defendant knew
the goods to have been part of an interstate shipment. If he knows the goods
were stolen, he receives them at the peril of their having been stolen while in
the course of interstate shipment.
(3) It is erroneous to instruct the jury that they may convict the accused
where it appears that the circumstances under which the defendant received the
goods were such that a reasonable man would have doubted the title of his
transfer. "The result of the rule of the charge would be to convict a man,
not becalise guilty, but because stupid."
REuGIoUS Lianry.
People v. Cole, 113 N. E. 790 (N. Y. Court of Appeals).
The defendant, a member of the Christian Science Church and a recognized
practitioner within its rules was indicted under the New York medical practice
act for practicing medicine without a license. Held, judgment of conviction
reversed. The New York statute expressly provides that the section relating
to the practice of medicine "shall not be construed to affect . . . the prac-
tice of the religious tenets of any church" and the constitution provides that
"The free exercise and enJoyment of religious profession and. worship, with-
out discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed in fhe state to all
mankind; " "'The -Christian Science Church is in terms expressly ex-
cepted from the prohibition contained in the medical practice acts of many of
the states. It' is so expressly excepted in the statutes of Maine, New Hamp-
shire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, North Carolina, North and South Dakota,
Kentucky, Tennessee, and Wisconsin."
"We think the exception in the statute in this state is broad enough to
lgermit offering prayer for the healing of disease in accordance with the recog-
nized tenets of the Christian Science Church."
BAaRm-r, C. J., in concurring said: "I concur in judge Chase's con-
struction of the statute. But I would go farther. I deny the power of the
Legislature.to makce it a crime to treat disease by prayer."
JUDICIAL DECISIONS 771
UsuRY.
People v. Silverberg, 160. N. Y. Supp. 727. The Loan Shark.
The complainant, who was in sharp need of money, applied to the defend-
ant for a loan of $100 and was told by the defendant that he would sell him
a diamond ring which he could pawn for that amount. The ring was delivered
to the complainant upon-his offering to pay the defendant $295 in monthly in-
stallments. The ring was pawned for $125. The wholesale value of the ring
was $145 and its retail value $180. Held: This transaction was usurious.
"Courts always attempt to search out the real nature of a transaction, and will
never allow more form to circumvent the law." . . . Where usury is dis-
guised under a sale of merchandise, the property in the goods passes to the
vendor, but the excess of price over the just value is considered as a premium
for the forbearance of the debt, founded on a presumed loan of so much of the
purchase money as is equivalent to the cash value of the commodity soldl
any consideration paid or secured to the vendor beyond that will, iv
general, be considered as interest for its forbearance."
